I WENT down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon the son of GLAUCON - CEPHALUS - SOCRATES. Accordingly regrets, and also the complaints about relations, are to be without; the one counselling, and the other fighting under. from the city to the individual, Socrates warns Glaucon (a warning that will . nitive therapy is founded on the principle that by being fully con scious of behavior There is a reciprocal relation between our brain state and. Is Glaucon right, that not only would anyone do what Gyges did (basically take whatever he Socrates defies the statement by giving a city-soul example.
For Aristodemus, Socrates becomes the only object worthy of his eros, the only thing worth serving. Xenophon's depiction of Aristodemus is quite telling on this point. Xenophon relates a "conversion he once heard about the daimon" between Aristodemus and Socrates.
Aristodemus remarks that he will believe in such things "whenever they send counselors, just as you say they send, that say what it is necessary to do and not do" I, IV, Aristodemus wants to be commanded. Aristodemus treats Socrates as the divine messenger. Allan Bloom remarks, "the contemplation of his virtues becomes a kind of religion" Aristodemus does whatever Socrates tells him to do. Aristodemus is an idolater; he worships Socrates as divine.
The Allegory of the Cave by Plato: Summary, Analysis & Explanation
Imitation of Socratic Narration Besides imitating Socrates' non-narrative behavior, Aristodemus also manifests his obsession with Socrates by narrating accounts about Socrates. Aristodemus narrates stories about Socrates so that he can become more like Socrates. Aristodemus customarily narrates accounts about Socrates. Apollodorus makes this point clear.
By attributing the origin of his narrative knowledge to Aristodemus, he associates Aristodemus with narrative activity b Further, when Apollodorus tells Glaucon that Aristodemus told both Phoenix and himself about Agathon's party bhe attests to the frequency with which Aristodemus probably narrated accounts about Socrates. However, despite the frequency with which Aristodemus narrated, Apollodorus does not trust his story. Apollodorus checks part of Aristodemus' narrated account with Socrates' version b In doing so, he implies that Aristodemus' accounts were not entirely reliable.
Aristodemus does not care for his narration. The only thing Aristodemus cares about is Socrates. Like Aristodemus, Apollodorus displays his love of Socrates by imitation. However, while Aristodemus imitates both Socrates' narrative and non-narrative behavior, Apollodorus primarily simulates Socrates' narrative activity.
Like Aristodemus, Apollodorus tells these narrations to exhibit his dedication to Socrates. Unlike Aristodemus, Apollodorus specifically sees his narrates as a means by which he exhibits his care for Socrates. Apollodorus "has made it his business [epimeles] to know everything Socrates says or does" c5.
He reveals this careful dedication to Socrates by narrating the entire Symposium. Apollodorus has also made it his business to narrate this knowledge of Socrates to others. Apollodorus defines himself as a bard spreading the Socratic word. Fittingly, Apollodorus focuses first on what Socrates "says [lege]" c6.
Socrates' words, the stories he narrates, captivate Apollodorus' attention. Apollodorus also orients himself toward Socrates' words when he checks Aristodemus' narrated account with Socrates' version. Using Socrates' words as the touchstone, Apollodorus affirm the veracity of Aristodemus' account. He asserts that it "agrees with what was narrated" b5. Apollodorus again displays the primacy he places on spoken narration when he remarks to Glaucon that the road is just right for "speaking and listening" b8.
Given Apollodorus' infatuation with Socrates' spoken narrations, it is hardly surprising that he imitates them. Because he values Socrates so highly, Apollodorus proves his narrative prowess before he can worthily narrate an account about Socrates.
He displays his narrative credentials. Apollodorus narrates an account about himself narrating an account before he narrates an account about Socrates ac. Apollodorus' inclusion of himself in his narration shows the pride that Apollodorus takes in his narrating activity.
20th WCP: Responding to Socrates Pedagogical Provocation
Apollodorus surely recognizes that he simulates Socrates by simulating Socrates' narrative activity. Unfortunately, Apollodorus' pride is hubristic because he does not resemble Socrates in any philosophical sense.
One interpreter remarks, "Apollodorus is nothing but a philosophical parrot who Apollodorus does not imitate Socrates in philosophy. Though Socrates uses narrative with the hope that it will lead others toward philosophical contemplation, Apollodorus does not move beyond the narrative level. Halperin notes, "when Apollodorus gets to the end of it, he simply shuts off, like a gramophone record that has finished playing" Several instances in the Symposium testify to Apollodorus' emotional preoccupation with Socrates.
Glaucon calls him Socrates' "hetaire" b6. The Phaedo corroborates Apollodorus' emotional attachment to Socrates. Given the characterization of Apollodorus in the Phaedo, it seems more likely that his narrations about Socrates grow out of this emotional attachment rather than from any philosophical interest.
His use of chairo reveals the emotional nature of his philosophic experience as the word suggests a sense of great rejoicing and excitement.
Despite these protestations, Apollodorus shows little interest in philosophy. Halperin underscores this point as well. He remarks, "Far from being true philosophers, Apollodorus and Aristodemus appear to function entirely as sites of Socratic inscription" Furthermore, his narration threatens to preclude the practice of philosophy altogether.
The dialogue begins when someone asks about the erotic and ostensibly philosophic speeches that took place at Agathon's a. Instead of telling the speeches and engaging in a philosophical discussion about them, Apollodorus narrates. The dialogue begins with Apollodorus' digressive narrative account about having just recently told the same story.
Apollodorus' audience must interrupt him twice to get him to relate the philosophical speeches d4 and e4.
Apollodorus would rather narrate details about himself and Socrates than philosophize about eros and the good.
George Penwill characterizes Apollodorus and Aristodemus in the following way: Plato uses a parable, a short informative story, to illustrate 'forms' and the 'cave,' in his main work, The Republic which first appeared around BC. The Allegory of the Cave The dialogue between Socrates and Glaucon is probably fictitious and composed by Plato; whether or not the allegory originated with Socrates, or if Plato is using his mentor as a stand-in for his own idea, is unclear.
In the dialogue, Socrates asks Glaucon to imagine a cave, in which prisoners are kept. These prisoners have been in the cave since their childhood, and each of them is held there in a peculiar manner.
Glaucon - Wikipedia
They are all chained so that their legs and necks are immobile, forced to look at a wall in front of them. Behind the prisoners is a fire and between the fire and the prisoners is a raised walkway, on which people can walk. These people are puppeteers, and they are carrying objects, in the shape of human and animal figures, as well as everyday items.
The prisoners could only see these flickering images on the wall, since they could not move their heads; and so, naturally enough, they presumed the images to be real, rather than just shadowy representations of what is actually real. In fact, Socrates claimed, the images on the wall would be so real that the prisoners would assign prestige among each other to the one who could recall the most detail about the shapes, the order in which they appeared and which might typically be found together or in tandem.
Of course, Socrates would point out, this was hollow praise, since, in fact, the images were not real. Which is a just principle?
Then on this view also justice will be admitted to be the having and doing what is a man's own, and belongs to him? Think, now, and say whether you agree with me or not.
Suppose a carpenter to be doing the business of a cobbler, or a cobbler of a carpenter; and suppose them to exchange their implements or their duties, or the same person to be doing the work of both, or whatever be the change; do you think that any great harm would result to the State?
But when the cobbler or any other man whom nature designed to be a trader, having his heart lifted up by wealth or strength or the number of his followers, or any like advantage, attempts to force his way into the class of warriors, or a warrior into that of legislators and guardians, for which he is unfitted, and either to take the implements or the duties of the other; or when one man is trader, legislator, and warrior all in one, then I think you will agree with me in saying that this interchange and this meddling of one with another is the ruin of the State.
Seeing, then, I said, that there are three distinct classes, any meddling of one with another, or the change of one into another, is the greatest harm to the State, and may be most justly termed evil-doing? And the greatest degree of evil-doing to one's own city would be termed by you injustice? This, then, is injustice; and on the other hand when the trader, the auxiliary, and the guardian each do their own business, that is justice, and will make the city just.
I agree with you. First let us complete the old investigation, which we began, as you remember, under the impression that, if we could previously examine justice on the larger scale, there would be less difficulty in discerning her in the individual.6. The Disordered Soul: Thémis and PTSD
That larger example appeared to be the State, and accordingly we constructed as good a one as we could, knowing well that in the good State justice would be found.
Let the discovery which we made be now applied to the individual - if they agree, we shall be satisfied; or, if there be a difference in the individual, we will come back to the State and have another trial of the theory.
The friction of the two when rubbed together may possibly strike a light in which justice will shine forth, and the vision which is then revealed we will fix in our souls. I proceeded to ask: When two things, a greater and less, are called by the same name, are they like or unlike in so far as they are called the same? The just man then, if we regard the idea of justice only, will be like the just State? And a State was thought by us to be just when the three classes in the State severally did their own business; and also thought to be temperate and valiant and wise by reason of certain other affections and qualities of these same classes?
And so of the individual; we may assume that he has the same three principles in his own soul which are found in the State; and he may be rightly described in the same terms, because he is affected in the same manner? Once more, then, O my friend, we have alighted upon an easy question - whether the soul has these three principles or not?
Nay, rather, Socrates, the proverb holds that hard is the good. Very true, I said; and I do not think that the method which we are employing is at all adequate to the accurate solution of this question; the true method is another and a longer one.
Still we may arrive at a solution not below the level of the previous inquiry. May we not be satisfied with that? I, too, I replied, shall be extremely well satisfied. Then faint not in pursuing the speculation, he said. Must we not acknowledge, I said, that in each of us there are the same principles and habits which there are in the State; and that from the individual they pass into the State?
Take the quality of passion or spirit; it would be ridiculous to imagine that this quality, when found in States, is not derived from the individuals who are supposed to possess it, e. Exactly so, he said. There is no difficulty in understanding this. But the question is not quite so easy when we proceed to ask whether these principles are three or one; whether, that is to say, we learn with one part of our nature, are angry with another, and with a third part desire the satisfaction of our natural appetites; or whether the whole soul comes into play in each sort of action - to determine that is the difficulty.
Yes, he said; there lies the difficulty. Then let us now try and determine whether they are the same or different. I replied as follows: The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the same part or in relation to the same thing at the same time, in contrary ways; and therefore whenever this contradiction occurs in things apparently the same, we know that they are really not the same, but different.
For example, I said, can the same thing be at rest and in motion at the same time in the same part? Still, I said, let us have a more precise statement of terms, lest we should hereafter fall out by the way.
Imagine the case of a man who is standing and also moving his hands and his head, and suppose a person to say that one and the same person is in motion and at rest at the same moment - to such a mode of speech we should object, and should rather say that one part of him is in motion while another is at rest. And suppose the objector to refine still further, and to draw the nice distinction that not only parts of tops, but whole tops, when they spin round with their pegs fixed on the spot, are at rest and in motion at the same time and he may say the same of anything which revolves in the same spothis objection would not be admitted by us, because in such cases things are not at rest and in motion in the same parts of themselves; we should rather say that they have both an axis and a circumference; and that the axis stands still, for there is no deviation from the perpendicular; and that the circumference goes round.
But if, while revolving, the axis inclines either to the right or left, forward or backward, then in no point of view can they be at rest. That is the correct mode of describing them, he replied. Then none of these objections will confuse us, or incline us to believe that the same thing at the same time, in the same part or in relation to the same thing, can act or be acted upon in contrary ways.
Yet, I said, that we may not be compelled to examine all such objections, and prove at length that they are untrue, let us assume their absurdity, and go forward on the understanding that hereafter, if this assumption turn out to be untrue, all the consequences which follow shall be withdrawn. Yes, he said, that will be the best way. Well, I said, would you not allow that assent and dissent, desire and aversion, attraction and repulsion, are all of them opposites, whether they are regarded as active or passive for that makes no difference in the fact of their opposition?
Yes, he said, they are opposites. Well, I said, and hunger and thirst, and the desires in general, and again willing and wishing - all these you would refer to the classes already mentioned. You would say - would you not? And what would you say of unwillingness and dislike and the absence of desire; should not these be referred to the opposite class of repulsion and rejection?
Admitting this to be true of desire generally, let us suppose a particular class of desires, and out of these we will select hunger and thirst, as they are termed, which are the most obvious of them? Let us take that class, he said. The object of one is food, and of the other drink? Yes, he replied, the opponent might have something to say. I do not know what you mean. The object of science is knowledge assuming that to be the true definitionbut the object of a particular science is a particular kind of knowledge; I mean, for example, that the science of house-building is a kind of knowledge which is defined and distinguished from other kinds and is therefore termed architecture.
My meaning was, that if one term of a relation is taken alone, the other is taken alone; if one term is qualified, the other is also qualified. I do not mean to say that relatives may not be disparate, or that the science of health is healthy, or of disease necessarily diseased, or that the sciences of good and evil are therefore good and evil; but only that, when the term "science" is no longer used absolutely, but has a qualified object which in this case is the nature of health and disease, it becomes defined, and is hence called not merely science, but the science of medicine.
I quite understand, and, I think, as you do. Exactly so, he replied. Yes, he said, it constantly happens. Would you not say that there was something in the soul bidding a man to drink, and something else forbidding him, which is other and stronger than the principle which bids him?
I should say so. We can call the reflective element in the mind the reason, and the element with which it feels hunger and thirst, and the agitation of sex and other desires, the element of irrational appetite - an element closely connected with satisfaction and pleasure" Yes, he said, we may fairly assume them to be different. And what of passion, or spirit? Is it a third, or akin to one of the preceding?
I should be inclined to say - akin to desire. The story is, that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, coming up one day from the Piraeus, under the north wall on the outside, observed some dead bodies lying on the ground at the place of execution.