The Pakistan-North Korea nexus
In a statement, the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) said the I am very proud of our missile developers but have ever had a failed test?. The Shaheen II (Haft VI) is a two-stage road mobile missile with a km range Thus, democratization failed to abate the organizational, security, and However, Indian-Chinese relations indirectly motivated Pakistani missile proliferation. field trials of the Hatf ended in failure, with the missiles frequently blowing up in the relationship which has evolved over four decades. . Ghauri-III. •. Shaheen -III. Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). • Taimur 7, km, a proposed ICBM .
Pakistan considers its nuclear weapons to be national "crown jewels" and likely holds missile delivery systems in a similar regard. Barring substantial changes in South Asian geopolitics, a change in attitude seems unlikely. Pakistan is still reliant on foreign partners to acquire and develop missile technology.
Pakistan's nucelar capable Ghauri missile is a failure
Pakistan currently deploys three tiers of ballistic missiles: Although listed as a ballistic missile capable of carrying an unconventional warhead, the Hatf I is not a guided missile, and more closely resembles battlefield artillery. The development of the Nasr raises serious proliferation concerns, as it provides a quick-launch battlefield nuclear deterrent weapon that could easily lead to force escalation or an arms race of similar weapons and deterrent systems in the region.
Whereas the Nasr fulfills the role of a tactical, battlefield deterrent, the Abdali, with a range of km, will serve as a more traditional short-range strategic deterrent.
The Ghaznavi has a range of km and the Shaheen I km. Cruise Missiles Pakistan currently has three cruise missiles in development with land, air, and sea launch capabilities. The lack of mass production efforts suggests that Pakistan intended the missiles be used primarily as training tools. Arms Race with India, Interagency Competition, and Foreign Assistance Despite political reforms during the to Benazir Bhutto government, democratization efforts in Pakistan did not moderate the country's zeal for missile acquisition.Pakistan conducts successful launch of Ghauri missile system - Headlines 12 AM - 9 Oct 2018 - Dunya
Khan, and General Aslam Beg continued to dominate military and national security issues. Insurgency in Kashmir further exacerbated relations with India and strengthened the military's control over nuclear and missile programs.
Finally, the relatively unstable political regimes in both India and Pakistan in the early s prevented sustained dialogue and normalization of relations. As of now, according to the Bulletin, "we estimate that India has produced nuclear warheads".
In the case of Pakistan, whose evaluation was done inthe Bulletin analysis has said that "it has the world's fastest-growing nuclear stockpile", estimating that Pakistan "has nuclear weapons". The Pakistani arsenal, too, consists of mainly aircraftdropped bombs, but with its Chinese-supplied missiles, it has a deployed arsenal of missiles like the Ghaznavi, Shaheen I and Ghauri and is developing longer-range missiles.
India's nuclear arsenal failed by 'unreliable' missiles
Significantly, Pakistan's Indiaspecific arsenal comprises of the Nasr short-range 70 km ballistic missile, which can use nuclear weapons to take out troop formations and Pakistan is in the advanced stage of developing two cruise missiles - the Babur and the Raad.
If this is dismaying for New Delhi, the comparison with China is positively alarming. Beijing has an arsenal of or so warheads and it is adding to this number, though not at the pace Pakistan is. Its nuclear weapons are primarily delivered through a mature missile arsenal with ranges from 2, km.
Pakistan | Countries | NTI
A large number of Chinese missiles, including their cruise missiles, are primarily for use in nonnuclear conventional battle role. Raghavan acknowledges that "China is a different kettle of fish", but he says even so, with the Agni V test, "India's progress has been commendable".
In this transaction, Pakistan played a double game. On one hand, the then ruling military regime of the late Zia-ul-Haq collaborated with the US Central Intelligence Agency and Iraqi intelligence in destabilisation operations directed at the Sunni Balochis living on the Iranian side of the border.
Babur (cruise missile)
At the same time, it clandestinely allowed the transport by road of North Korean arms and ammunition meant for use by the Iranian army against the Iraqis. Pakistani army officers were also sent to Libya to help train Libyan army officers in the use and maintenance of North Korean weaponry. During the Zia regime, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and its North Korean counterpart collaborated closely for the clandestine acquisition of nuclear- and missile-related equipment and technology from erstwhile West Germany and other Western countries.
Since North Korea did not have either a presence or funds and other capability to indulge in clandestine procurement from the West, it gave lists of its requirements to the ISI, which procured them and passed them on. Some of the missiles in the Pakistani army's stock were given to North Korean intelligence for this purpose. Iranian intelligence agreed to fund the project.